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A . Introduction 
Tourism is not only an important foreign exchange earner but it is 
one of the fastest growing Industrie , in East Africa.^" There are two 
reasons why international trade theory, a branch of economics explicitly 
dealing with transactions between the domestic economy and the rest of 
the world, is inadequate for dealing with tourism. First, government 
expenditures to encourage tourism which are not directly revenue generat-
ing are important in tourism (the most obvious example is advertising). 
It is true that governments also spend to encourage foreign demand for 
the ir commodity exportSo But this is less important for most commodities 
than for tourism and in any event is not, to my knowledge, a developed 
part of trade theory,, 
Second, and requiring a more thorough revision, is the difference 
in the price structure at which transactions take place in the two 
problems. By means of import duties and export taxes the government is 
able to construct a totally different domestic price structure than the 
prices at which foreign trade takes place. For example, in the theory 
of the scientific tariff the government can take advantage of any monopoly 
power which it may have in foreign trade without affecting the domestic 
equality of marginal rates of substitution and transformation. On the 
other hand, tourists in East Africa, and many other places trade with 
domestic suppliers at the same prices as domestic consumers. There are 
some exceptions, such as game park entrance fees in Kenya and Tanzania,. 
i 
but the bulk of transactions fit this description. (in some countries tli-fre 
•is far more separation of tourists and domestic consumers, with tourist-only 
shops and hotels, and tourist tax rebates, but these are not, as yet, 
practical alternatives in East Africa.) 
This paper proceeds in several steps to show the implications of 
the differences between tourism and other international trade transactions 
described above. After defining tourist demands in Section B, Section 
contains a discussion of an economy with a single resident consumer (or 
equivalently iump-sum redistribution among consumers to maximize social 
welfare) where tourists face different prices from the domestic consumer 
and with government expenditures to encourage tourism. We then, in 
Section D consider the case where the single domestic consumer and the 
tourists face the same prices, which are all subject to excise taxes 
should the government so desire. Finally, in Section E, we drop the 
assumption of single consumer (i.e. we drop the assumption of lum-sum 
taxes). 
1. See F» Mitchell, "The Costs and Benefits of East African Tourism" 
EAER., June 1969 
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Bo Tourist Demand 
Let w be the vector of net demands by tourists for all commodities 
in which they make transactions with the domestic economy. We stress 
that w includes all commodities including the foreign currency which 
they bring t . make purchases (as a good supplied this will appear as a 
negative net demand). Let q be the vector of prices facing tourists. 
Then, since w includes all tourist demanded commodities the tourist 
budget constraint is qw = 0, assuming that tourists do not accumulate 
bad debts or lend without getting return. Ve shall assume that either 
directly (as with game park fees) or indirectly (through taxes and 
tariffs) the government has full control over the set of prices at which 
tourist" transact. This is not strictly true for there are many domestic 
commodities purchased (e.g. food, hotel services, curios) which are not 
subject to excise taxes in all three countries. IZi - v.: r , it does not 
seem administratively infeasible to tax (the major value) of these commodit-
ies. W e , therefore, assume this to be a policy decision and discuss the 
appropriate levels of the taxes on tourist commodities. 
Tourist demand is affected by the level of government services 
provided in addition to the prices tourists face Let us denote by z 
the net demand by the government for commodities used to encourage tourist 
demand. For example, the government demands foreign currencies to pay 
for advertising abroad of tourist attractions; the government demands 
labour and capital services to provide adequate tourist handling facilities 
at the airport and roads in game reserves and so on. We shall assume that 
2 
these services affect tourists but do not affect domestic consumers. 
We have agreed that tourist demand depends on two factors, prices 
and the quality of government services. Thus we can write demand as 
w(q,z). Let us note that we assume tourist demand to be homogeneous of 
degree zero in all prices. Thus we can use foreign currency as numeraire 
tourists only caring about the cost in their home currencies of tourism 
and not in nominal prices. 
2. With the exception of advertising abroad, this is an unrealistic 
assumption since domestic consumers also use airport, game reserves, 
and almost all services provided for tourists. To extend the model 
to include these effects would only require the subtraction of 
domestic benefits from the cost of providing services. This extension 
is straight forward and is not directly discussed here. 
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Co Fully Controlled Economy; Lump Sura redistribution; price discrimina-
tion against tourist possible. 
Let us begin with the unrealistic case where the tourists can be 
fully isolated from the domestic economy. Thus, we assume that the govern-
ment has the power to set prices which tourists will face independent of 
the prices existing in the economy for residents. This case, which 
parallels the structure of normal foreign trade, is our starting point 
to bring out the differences inherent in tourism. Let us further assume 
that there is one domestic consumer or equivalently the government has the 
power t levy lump sum taxes within the domestic economy and so can achieve 
3 
any income distribution that is technologically feasible. 
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 denote by » the vector of aggregate supply by producers. 
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Let us denote the aggregate production constraint by F(y) = 0. Given the 
full control over prices and income distribution, we can equally well 
assume that the government directly controls x and y. We can thus set 
up the problem of welfare maximization in the f llowing familiar form 
(1) Maximize' U(x) 
q,x,y,z subject to w(q,z) + x = y - z, 
F(y) = 0. 
where the constraints reflect market clearance and production possibilities. 
Let us form a Lagrangian expression from this maximization, using the 
vector A for multipliers for the market clearance equations and /A as 
multiplier for the production constraint. Then, we can write the Lagran-
gian expression as 
(2) L(q,x,y
s
z,^
5 i
tO = U(x) - ^ ( w C q . z ) + x - y + z) ~j(F(y). 
Differentiating the Lagrangian expression with respect to the 
Lagrange multipliers and equating these expression to zero, we obtain the 
constraints we have written above, so we need not repeat them. Different 
tiating with respect to consumer quantities, we obtain the n equations 
( 3 )
 B . _ > _
 n
 k = 1,2, 
3x
k
 - 0 
or in vector notation 
(4) U
x
 - 0. 
Differentiating with respect to production supplies we obtain the n 
equations 
3. See P.A. Samuelson, "Social Indifference Curves", Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Feb. 1956. 
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The first order conditions for consumption and production taken together 
give us the familiar condition that marginal rates of substitution in 
consumption should equal marginal rates of transformation in production. 
This familiar necessary condition for Pareto oprimality is not altered by 
the opportunities of tourism when tourists can be charged separate prices 
from those faced by citizens. As we will see below this ceases to be 
true when tourists and domestic consumers face the same prices. 
Now let us turn to the conditions obtained from the variables which 
affect tourism directly, q and z. Differentiating the Lagrangian expression 
with respect to tourist prices we obtain the equation 
- i K/ ' 
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Differentiating with respect to government expenditures to encourage 
tourism we obtain the conditions 
(9) f \ i 4 \ . _ u 
t . fe-
or, in vector notation, 
(10) \ u I + \ - & -I 
Z. 
From the first order conditions obtained above we know that the Lagrange 
multipliers are proportional to the prices which would exist in the 
domestic economy were we to decentralize. Let us denote the prices faced 
by domestic producers and consumers by p. Then we can rewrite the above 
conditions as 
(11) Pw = o, f P - D 
q / -t * 
Looking at these two equations we see that they are the first 
order conditions for maximizing the profit from tourism, calculated in 
the prices of the domestic economy, calculated also with prices assumed 
constant. Thus it is possible to decentralize the tourist industry under 
government control with the simple instruction to the managers to 
maximize profits, acting as price takers for producer prices. 
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We can state this problem as 
(12) Maximize = Pw(q,z) = Pz 
q
s
z 
It may seem surprising to express this problem with minus signs but it 
should be remembered that w includes not just the commodities purchased 
by tourists !^ at some resource cost to society) but also the foreign 
exchange they bring with them to purchase these commodities- Since the 
foreign exchange is what they supply to obtain commodities it appears as 
a negative net demand. Thus the maximization problem has the familiar 
form of maximizing revenue less the cost of supplying demand and less 
the cost of tourist encouraging government expenditures. 
We can also approach the problem of decentralization by assuming 
the tourist industry is left in private (competitive) hands but that taxes 
are levied on sales to tourists (and not to residents). Let us denote by 
t the vector of taxes applied on these transactions. Then these taxes are 
the difference between tourist prices and producer prices, t = q = p. 
Since qw is equal to zero, the problem of maximizing ~ pw~pz is mathemati-
cally equivalent to that of maximizing tw~pz. Thus, we can state the 
problem as 
(13) Maximize tw(p+t,z) - pft 
t, z 
4 
and the first order conditions as 
(14) w + tw = 0, tw = P = 0 
q z 
Thus we can restate the first order conditions in this context as: set 
taxes and have the government spend to encourage tourism to maximize 
the tax revenue from tourists less the cost of tourist encouragement. 
None of the conditions derived thus far will come as a surprise 
to any economist who has given a moment's thought to this problem. The 
interesting question is what happens to those simple instructions for 
tourist management when we introduce various complications. The complica= 
tion we shall begin with is the fact that by and large tourist trade at 
the same prices as domestic consumers. 
4. The equivalence of first order conditions (14) and T*> i-'G given 
above, (11), can be seen by appropriate differentiation of the tourist 
budget constraint, (p + t) w = 0 , w + (P + t) w = 0 . 
Do Uniform Consumer and Tourist Prices; Lump Sum Redistribution Possible; 
Price Discrimination Against Tourists 
Impossible. 
To move from the previous model to one where tourists and resident 
consumers face the same prices, we shall drop the tourist prices, q, as a 
control variable and replace that with the constraint that tourist prices 
equal domestic prices. Since consumers will equate marginal utilities 
with prices (except for a constant of proportionality) we can use the 
marginal utilities as tourist prices. We can now restate the maximization 
problem given in (1) above to be 
(15) Maximize U(x) 
subject to w(U ,z) + x = y - z 
X 
F(y) = 0. 
As before, we shall form this into a Lagrangian expression with multip-
L ( 
liers for market clearance equations and^for the production constraint; 
(16) L(x,y,z,A ,f,y\= U(x) = \ (w(U (x),z) + x-y+z) - ^ F ( y ) . 
/ \ X / 
Differentiating the Lagrangian with respect to production supplies and 
equating with zero we obtain the equations 
v t p 
(17) - Lt —
 ?
 o a r A ~ P f ~ ° 
* ' ' V 
This is the same condition obtained above, that the Lagrange multipliers 
are proportional to the marginal rates of transformation in production. 
Thus, if we decentralize production the Lagrange multipliers are the 
prices, let us call them p, which producers will face. 
When we differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to consumption 
quantities we do not obtain the condition that marginal rates of substi= 
tution should equal marginal rates of transformation. Rather, the fact 
that the profit from tourism depends on the prices which domestic 
consumers face implies that we shall trade equality of MRS
0
 s and MRT's 
for profit from tourism and the first order conditions for consumer 
prices will reflect a tradeoff at the margin between these two considerations. 
Differentiating (16) with respect to x we obtain the condition 
(18) -7){J ^ s ^ j _ ^ r O 
L \ A
 v
 ^ 
or in vector notation 
U 5 )
 O
x
 ~ X - ^ ^ x 
- 0 
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Since marginal utilities are proportional t consumer^, prices whi^E-the 
Lagrangian multipliers are proportional to producer prices, equation (19) 
gives an expression for the optipfial tax structure. Where there is slope 
to tourist demands and so monopoly power to exercise. Equation (19) 
demonstrates the fact that it is no longer desirable to have marginal 
rates of substitution and transformation equal when consumers and 
tourists face the same prices. Rather than interpreting this equation 
in its present form to obtain the rules for the optimal tax structure, 
we shall wait until the next section where we reformulate the basic model 
directly in terms of prices and so obtain a more easily interpreted 
condition. 
Let us turn no^ to government expenditures to encourage tourism. 
Differentiating the Lagrangian (16) with respect t o z we obtain the 
conditions 
\ N \ \ V 
(20)
 X
L t t * °
 r r A v i
x ° " ° 
Comparing this expression with that obtained in the previous model, 
equation (9), we see that we have the same condition and it is subject 
to the same interpretation. We wish to saximize the profits from tourism, 
calculated at producer prices, or in the presence of decentralization and 
taxes we wish to maximize the tax revenue from tourism less the cost of 
expenditures. This remains true even though the taxes are now no longer 
set just to maximize tax revenue but rather trade off the receipt of 
revenue from tourists with the wedge driven between domestic MRS's and 
MRT's caused by also taxing domestic consumers. 
E. Income Distribution; No Lump Sum Redistribution: Price discrimination 
against Tourists Impossible. 
Thus far we have assumed that the government has the power to 
redistribute income however it wishes at no cost. This is clearly an 
-5" 
unrealistic assumption. Ve shall move to the opposite extreme and 
a 
assume that the government has no direct redistributive powers. 
Rathe^ a desirable distribution of income is secured by taxing the goods 
demanded by those the government wants to redistribute away from and 
subsidizing those goods which are bought by those the government wished 
to redistribute towards^. We still assume that it is impossible to 
5. This section is an extension of P. Diamond and tUi r r Ifd , "Optimal 
Taxation and Public Production", unpublished. 
6. More realistically we could introduce government expenditures for 
defense, etc., and use the tax powers to collect different amounts 
of the necessary revenue from different people, but this would not 
alter the analysis. 
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set different 
prices on the sane goods tjik-SR by tourists and domestic 
consumers. We shall further assume that all production possibilities 
remain in the hands of.the government. Thus domestic consumers receive 
no lum sum payments. If we know the set of prices which they face, we 
know both the quantities they demand and the levels of utility which they 
have. Thus with great generality we can describe the government®s 
objective function as a function solely of prices the consumers face, 
V(q). We shall write '-{^p" ic. consumer demands as x(q) using the 
same notation for the demand function which we previously used for the 
quantity demanded. We can now state the government maximization as 
(21) Maximize V(q) 
q,y,z subject to 
w(q,z), + x(q) = y - z 
F(y) - 0. 
As before we can form a Lagrangian expression with multipliers ;> andjj 
V f p - a ( j q , i x ^ v ^ i r " 
Differentiating with respect to the quantity variables, y and z we obtain 
the same form of equation which we had before 
( 2 3 )
 A - v ^ - ° ; > " 4
 4
 > -
1 3 
Thus even when lump sum redistribution of income is impossible and income 
distribution is one of the problems in the economy in the presence of the 
optimal excise tax structure government expenditures to encourage 
tourism should be planned to maximize the profits from tourism or 
equivalently the tax revenue less the cost of the expenditures. 
Differentiating the Lagrangian expression with respect to consumer prices, 
q, we obtain the remaining first order conditions for optimally 
controlling this economy. __ 
I f U^t si \ 
or, in vector notation 
(») ^ - \ ; ^ Y 
First let us examine the expression that comes after the Lagrange 
multiplier. Recalling that the Lagrangian is proportional to producer 
prices we see that the right hand expression is equal to the change in value 
of both tourist and consumer demands, calculated at producer prices, 
which arises from raising the kth consumer price. In a decentralised 
setting, we can make use of the relation between consumer prices, producer 
prices, and taxes, q = p + t, to rewrite this expression. We noted 
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earlier that the tourist had a balanced budget, qw = 0, In this context 
where there are no lump sum transfers the domestic consumers also have 
balanced budgets, and so in aggregate qx = Q. Thus, differentiating the 
budget constraints with respect to prices we obtain 
(26) '<• ^ fv ~)Q k l
C
 ' ^
 1
 " ' 
-s { ftl ^
 P' 
:
X i /
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Thus we can substitute this expression in the first order conditions 
and describe the first order condition as a trade off between tax 
revenue from raising a tax and the direct impact on social welfare from 
having a higher consumer price. 
(27, a r / ~ - 1 1 . * U J ) --o 
The exact form of the first order condition will, of course depend 
on the exact form of the social welfare function. Let us explore the 
particular case where social welfare can be written as a function of 
individual utility levels. Let us denote consumer h's demand functions 
and utility function by ft ) ahd H (Jf) . Then we are assuming that 
social welfare has the form 
<28) v U y "'j 
Differentiating this equation with respect t a price we can obtain an 
alternate expression for the derivative jhich appears in the first order 
conditions _ . / ^ L - ^ 
•v,/ < ^ f ^ 1 1 1 - < A -
 A 
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where times the marginal utility of income and equation (25) 
is used t :> complete the analysis. 
Thus the first order condition for any tax trades off the tax 
revenue from raising the tax with the cost to individual consumers, 
weighted by their social marginal utilities of income^from the increase 
in a tax. Let us note that if we have a good purchased only by tourists, 
say good k , then social welfare is independent of its price, ~ O 
For such a good the government sets the tax rate to maximize tax revenue 
from tourists. It should be noted that it is not the tax revenue from 
this good that is maximized but the total tax revenue from tourists. 
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For example if the Kenya government were considering an embarkation 
tax for non-residents at the airport it should offset against the 
revenue of the tax the lost tax revenue to Kenya from any tourists who 
decide not to come t Kenya. Similarly, the setting of non-resident 
game park entrance fees should take into account not only the elasticity 
of demand for park visits but also the impact on the number of tourists 
coming to East Africa and the net revenue collected from them outside 
the parks. 
Unfortunately, from the point of view of analytical convenience 
the East African tax structure does not coincide with that of the model. 
It is necessary, then, to examine the major East African taxes to 
determine an appropriate treatment of the model is to be at least 
approximately applied to measuring the benefits of tourism or to setting 
policies to maximize those benefits. There are four basic sets of taxes, 
- sales and excises,customs, company and personal income taxes. 
Excise taxes falling on the final sale to consumers, tourists 
(e.g. Uganda and Tanzania hotel tax) are precisely the tax instruments 
examined in the model and require no further interpretation to be included 
in calculating the benefits from having an additional tourist. Most 
excises however are levied within the production sector rather than on 
sales to consumers (i.e. most excises are not levied on retail sales). 
Where there are fixed coefficients between the base of excise taxation 
and the product sold to the consumer, this does not matter for the tax 
is fully equivalent to one levied on the final sale. However, there is 
scope for different combinations of distinction expenditures with a 
given manufactured good. (This is not so true of the major excises -
Kenya and Tanzania on tobacco, beer and spirits, and petrol). This point 
does not seem too important, and it seems a reasonable approximation to 
include the full excise tax content of tourist expenditures in calculating., 
marginal benefits. 
Customs duties seem similar to excises in the relationship between 
where they are levied and the cost to consumers, so they can be treated 
on the same basis. Further, since East African demand is a small 
proportion of total demand for most goods, the world supply curve can be 
viewed as infinitely elastic. Thus the price actually paid reflects the 
marginal cost to East Africa for imports. Taking these considerations 
together, we can reasonably include the full customs duty content of 
tourist expenditures in calculating marginal benefits. The task of fitting 
the company income tax into the model is more complicated, in part due to 
the complications of the tax. To approach this question, let us consider 
various simple forms which are related to a company tax. First, we might 
think of it as pure profits tax. Then, the full value of the tax should 
be included in the benefits since profits are the excess of the expenditures 
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of tourists over the value of the resources in alternative uses at 
the margin. Alternatively, we can think of company taxation as a tax 
on the return to capital (equivalent to a tax which just alters the 
equilibrium interest rate.''' In this case, the alternative uses of 
capital at the margin give the same return and the company tax revenue 
should not be included in the marginal benefits of tourism. In this 
case we can think of the tax as levied between the production sector 
and the owners of capital. The tax would be relevant for calculating 
the advantages of inducing more foreign capital, say, but is not 
relevant for evaluating tourism.® Taking these two views together, 
some fraction, probably not too large, of company tax revenue due to 
tourists should be included in evaluating benefits. 
If we think of the personal tax as a tax on transactions between 
firms and suppliers of services, we have the same case as the second 
interpretation of the company tax above. Insofar as the gross-of-tax 
wage represents the alternative value to the production sector of 
using the resources elsewhere, this tax revenue is not a benefit from 
q 
tourism. 
Taking the above approximations we have the "rock bottom" estimate 
of the benefits of tourism calculated by Mitchell as a good 
approximation, with the need to add some company tax revenue and income 
taxes paid by expatriates and to make allowance for the fact that the 
East African tax structure is probably not quite optimal, nor has an 
equilibrium position been selected, since there is an excess supply of 
labor at present.10, H 
7. See P.A. Samuelson "Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to 
Insure Valuations," Journal of Political Economy, Dec., 
1964. 
8. Insofar as the presence of tourists induces a foreign capital flow 
which would not otherwise be present, the company tax on that capital 
represents a benefit from tourism. The problem of incorporating 
foreign production within the economy is, unfortunately, complicated 
and will be taken up in the future. 
9. Again an exception should be made for the personal income tax (and 
excises and customs) paid by expatriates who would not have come 
to East Africa if it were not for the additional tourists. 
10. Given these limitations on the model, it is possible that the 
additional income of the previously unemployed should enter the 
calculation of benefits. 
11. A similar problem exists of distinguishing domestic from Foreign 
airlines-and shipping companies. Thus the question of selecting 
a basis for tariffs as f.o.b or c.i.f. or some things in between 
requires a similar analysis but is further complicated by the fact 
that prices are set by international conferences. 
